MI: Child Support Info

Here is a good start to what you are looking for
 
http://traversecityfamilylaw.com/Documents/Berger_v_Berger.pdf
 
This Court recently stated the standard of review with respect to setting child support in
Stallworth v Stallworth, 275 Mich App 282; 738 NW2d 264 (2007):
The Michigan Legislature has required that when a court orders child support as
part of a divorce judgment, “the court shall order child support in an amount
determined by application of the child support formula developed by the state
friend of the court bureau” unless to do so would be “unjust or inappropriate” and
the trial court makes certain specified findings “in writing or on the record . . . .”
MCL 552.605(2); Peterson v Peterson, 272 Mich App 511, 516-517; 727 NW2d
393 (2006). Thus, a trial court must presumptively follow the Michigan Child
Support Formula (MCSF). If the court deviates, it must make an adequate record
regarding the mandatory statutory criteria for doing so. Burba v Burba (After
Remand), 461 Mich 637, 644-646; 610 NW2d 873 (2000). We review de novo
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whether a trial court properly reached its determination within the framework of
the MCSF or the statutory deviation criteria. Id. at 647; Peterson, supra at 516.
We review for clear error, however, the trial court’s factual findings underlying its
determination of a child support award. MCR 2.613(C); Beason v Beason, 435
Mich 791, 804-805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990). A finding is clearly erroneous if this
Court, on all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake was made; the appellant bears the burden of showing that a mistake was
made. Id. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s discretionary
rulings that are permitted by statute or the MCSF. Borowsky v Borowsky, 273
Mich App 666, 672; 733 NW2d 71 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs when
a court selects an outcome that is not within the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes.” Id., citing Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372,
388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). [Stallworth, supra at 283-284.]
With respect to child support, the trial court determined that plaintiff had the ability to
earn $50,000 a year either as a nurse or as a nurse and dance instructor. Yet the trial court only
used plaintiff’s lesser part-time employment income to calculate defendant’s child support
obligation. We conclude the trial court’s decision to not impute income more relevant to
plaintiff’s earning ability was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes and,
therefore, an abuse of discretion. Stallworth, supra at 284. The trial court’s decision provides
total support for plaintiff’s decision to work for just a few hours a week and thereby earn a small
fraction of the income she is capable of generating. Although it is within the trial court’s
discretion to consider the children’s ages and care needs when considering this issue, this Court
still concludes that it is unreasonable and unprincipled to place nearly 100% of the children’s
financial responsibility on defendant under these circumstances. Plaintiff elected to divorce, and
she chose to seek custody of the children, i.e., she sought to become a single parent. Moreover,
she has a great deal of education and is more than capable of helping to financially support her
children. She should not be treated so differently from defendant simply because she wishes at
this point to essentially be a stay-at-home mother. There is also, perhaps, some irony to the trial
court’s decision as it is evident that before the divorce and when the children were much
younger, plaintiff was frequently gone. In fact, she maintained an apartment in Ann Arbor while
pursing her graduate degree. Also, plaintiff’s cousin served for a lengthy period as their nanny,
apparently because both parties had so little time for childcare. Now, although plaintiff has
completed her education and is highly employable, she wants to spend most of her time at home.
But the fact is, she has a joint and several obligation to financially support her children. MCL
722.3(1); Borowsky, supra at 672. Indeed, as discussed supra, one factor the trial court weighed
in plaintiff’s favor in awarding plaintiff custody of the children was her ability to earn an annual
income of at least $50,000, ie., that she too could financially support the children. Under these
facts, the trial court’s decision unfairly allows plaintiff “to have her cake and eat it too.”
In calculating the contributions to support that divorced parents must make, the trial court
must generally follow the MCSF as developed by the Friend of the Court unless to do so would
be “unjust or inappropriate” and the trial court makes findings “in writing or on the record”
supporting a deviation as required by statute. MCL 552.605(2); Stallworth, supra at 283-284.
Here, the record does not indicate that the trial court believed it was deviating from the MCSF by
not imputing income to plaintiff and correctly noted that the final determination as to the
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appropriateness of imputing income in an individual case is a judicial one. As this Court
observed in Stallworth, supra at 285:
[T]he MCSF grants a court the discretion to impute income to a parent, 2004
MCSF 2.10(B), which the manual defines as “treating a party as having income or
resources that the individual does not actually have.” 2004 MCSF 2.10(A). “This
usually occurs in cases where there is a voluntarily [sic] reduction of income or a
voluntary unexercised ability to earn.” Id.
Nevertheless, the MCSF provides guidance to trial courts to determine whether to impute
income to a party. See Ghidotti v Barber, 459 Mich 189, 199; 586 NW2d 883 (1998).
When determining what income, if any [to impute], consider among other
equitable factors the following criteria:
(1) Prior employment experience;
(2) Education level;
(3) Physical and mental disabilities;
(4) The presence of parties’ children in the individual’s home and its impact
on the earnings;
(5) Availability of employment in the local geographical area;
(6) The prevailing wage rates in the local geographical area;
(7) Special skills and training; or
(8) Whether there is any evidence that the individual in question is able to
earn the imputed income. [2004 MCSF 2.10(E).]
These factors generally ensure that adequate fact-finding supports the conclusion that the
parent to whom income is imputed has an actual ability and likelihood of earning the imputed
income. Ghidotti, supra at 198-199; Stallworth, supra at 285. Here, however, it is undisputed
that plaintiff possessed the actual ability to earn the amount of income defendant argues the trial
court should have imputed to her. The presence of children in the home of the party is a factor
under the child support formula, but is directed to “its impact on the earnings.” 2004 MCSF
2.10(E)(4). In that regard, the trial court in awarding custody to plaintiff determined “that even
during the limited time frame when the Plaintiff-mother was working full-time, she was still able
to use a flexible schedule that maximized her quality time with the children.” Finally, 2004
MCSF 2.10(F) provides: “Imputation must be applied equally to payers and payees, and to men
and women.” (Emphasis added.) For these reasons, we conclude the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to impute income to plaintiff in an amount more truly representing her
earning capacity for the purpose of calculating defendant’s child support obligation.
 
As for the legal limits in Title 42
 
I believe that Michigan Support and Parenting Time Enforcement Act specifically recognizes those legal limits:

MCL 552.608 Limitation on amount of income withheld.

Sec. 8.The total amount of income withheld under this act under all orders to withhold income for current support, past due support, fees, and health care coverage premiums effective against a payer shall not exceed the maximum amount permitted under section 303(b) of title III of the consumer credit protection act, Public Law 90-321, 15 U.S.C. 1673.

http://legislature.mi.gov/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-552-608
 
 
Borowsky v. Borowsky, 273 Mich.App. 666, 733 N.W.2d 71, January 23, 2007:
Because the trial court did not properly apply the MCSF in calculating the applicable child support, we vacate the trial court’s child support order and remand for recalculation of the support order. On remand, the trial court shall recalculate defendant’s income consistent with this opinion. Upon recalculation, the trial court may elect to deviate from the MCSF should it conclude that application of the MCSF would be unjust or inappropriate under the facts of this case. If the trial court elects to deviate from the formula, it shall satisfy the requirements of MCL 552.605(2)(a) through (d). See Burba, supra at 643-649, 610 N.W.2d 873. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.